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Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik and
the World Trade Organization
BY MATTHEW SCHAEFER*

Introduction
During U.S. governmental consideration of the Uruguay Round
agreements creating the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), claims
of "lost sovereignty" were used as a rhetorical device by numerous

groups opposed to the WTO. The primary users of the rhetoric were
supporters of a more protectionist trade policy, most prominently Pat

Buchanan,1 and environmental activists, most closely associated today

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; Visiting
Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Spring 2002).
1. See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: How AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE BEING SACRIFICED TO THE GODS OF THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998); Patrick J. Buchanan, Showdown at the GATT Corral,

Oct. 9, 1994, at E4 ("To argue that the World Trade Organization it
creates will not diminish American sovereignty is absurd. Already we have
internalized our diminished status .... "); Patrick J. Buchanan, Fritz Hollings Derails
the GATT Express, DENVER POST, Oct. 2, 1994, at F4 ("In the World Trade
Organization, established by GATT, America surrenders her national sovereignty,
her freedom of action to defend her own economic vital interests from the job
pillagers of Tokyo and Beijing. We give up our freedom - to foreign bureaucrats who
will assume authority over America's commerce that the Founding Fathers gave
exclusively to the Congress of the United States. And, if we are outraged by WTO's
decisions, we have just one vote, out of 123, to challenge those decisions.... And in
[the] WTO, the U.S. has no veto power."). See also Paul Blustein, Buchanan Attacks
Put Trade Group on Spot; Experts Dispute Candidate's View of WTO, WASH. POST,
Feb. 16, 1996, at B1, available at 1996 WL 3064340 ("On the campaign trail,
Buchanan routinely excoriates the WTO as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. Harking
back to the American revolutionaries' stand against the British at Lexington and
Concord, he thundered in one recent speech: 'We're not going to take dictation ever
again from foreign countries, London, or foreign capitals."'). Ross Perot joined in
the sovereignty rhetoric as well. See, e.g., Ross Perot, Appeal to Trade Body Carries
Risks for U.S., HOUSTON CHRON., June 14, 1996, at 2, availableat 1996 WL 5604239
(noting that Perot, Buchanan and Ralph Nader all "attacked the WTO as a serious
threat to U.S. sovereignty").
DENVER POST,
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with Lori Wallach.2 While the Buchananites and Wallachians do not

share a common view of the world, both groups apparently believed
that sovereignty rhetoric might serve as an effective tool in garnering
broad public opposition to the WTO. Examples of this sovereignty
rhetoric during the mid-1990's debate within the United States over

the Uruguay Round agreements included newspaper ads with images
of large General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") (the
WTO's predecessor organization) policemen shattering the U.S.
Capitol Building with a sledge hammer or the Declaration of
Independence torn in two pieces These images invoke the most
traditional notions of sovereignty that ask who holds supreme power
over a given subject matter.4

However, the claims of lost sovereignty in this traditional sense
were easily and strongly refuted in legalistic terms.' Moreover, the
Wallachians and at least some Buchananites, far from suffering from
2. See, e.g., Moses Naim, Lori's War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 2000, at 28. See
also WTO's Slow Motion Coup Against Democracy (Interview with Lori Wallach),
MULTINAT'L MONITOR, Oct. 1, 1999, at 26, available at 1999 WL 17618175 ("The
GATT's dispute [settlement system], for instance, required consensus to adopt ...
any enforcement of it. Any individual country could exercise a sovereignty
"emergency break," block consensus and stop implementation of a ruling.");
Implications of CongressionalAction on U.S. Dolphin Protection Laws: Hearingon S.
1420 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation,104th Cong. (Apr. 30, 1996) (statement of
Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch) (footnote omitted)
("[T]he WTO's first ruling provides real life evidence of the WTO's threat to
democratic policy making, national sovereignty, and to environmental and health
protections."). Ralph Nader, the founder of Public Citizen, was the main public voice
from this group at the time the WTO was created. See Nader, Brown, Conservatives
Urge GATT Delay, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 1994, availableat 1994 WL 10121361.
Ms. Wallach has replaced Mr. Nader as the most visible voice.
3. See, e.g., Advertisement, Jeopardizedby GATT, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at
A15; Advertisement, Sabotage, ROLL CALL, May 18, 1992, at 18.
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation
or Cautious Small Step Forward?, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO
399-414 (2000); Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before
the Senate Finance Comm., 103d Cong. 114 (1994) (testimony of John H. Jackson);
Hearing on Uruguay Round Agreement, World Trade Organization and U.S.
Sovereignty Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 857
(1994) (testimony of John H. Jackson). See also William Sprance, The World Trade
Organizationand United States' Sovereignty: The Politicaland ProceduralRealities of
the System, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1225 (1998); Matthew Schaefer, National Review
of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO
Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307 (1996). For a political
scientist's debunking of the notion of a current retreat in sovereignty from a historical
perspective, see STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
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a general "treaty allergy," were simultaneously arguing for the
creation or adoption of international agreements and institutions
backed up by trade sanction enforcement in other policy areas.6 Both
the ease with which the legalistic response debunked the claim of lost
sovereignty and the selective application of sovereignty rhetoric by
these groups suggested that their actual concerns did not match the
rhetoric.

Instead, the underlying concern appears to be loss of influence.
Specifically, the Buchananites and Wallachians share a concern
relating to the degree of influence the WTO has on U.S. policymaking7 and, perhaps more central, the impact the WTO has on the
influence of various constituencies in the U.S. policy-making process.
In other words, the Buchananites and Wallachians worry that the

WTO shrinks overall U.S. influence within, or control over, the
international trading system and shrinks their groups' influence in the

U.S. policy-making process.
The legalistic response to lost
sovereignty rhetoric is incapable of fully responding to these
underlying concerns. Yet a realpolitik analysis of the WTO,
buttressed by over seven years of actual operation, not only confirms
the original legalistic refutations of lost sovereignty in its traditional
sense, but also indicates that loss of influence concerns are at best
greatly exaggerated.'
6. See, e.g., Naim, supra note 2, at 38-39.
7. For a related formulation on this first underlying concern, see John H.
Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and
Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 160
(1997) ("[W]hen a party argues that the U.S. should not accept a treaty because it
takes away U.S. sovereignty to do so, what that party most often really means is that
he or she believes a certain set of decisions should, as a matter of good government
policy, be made at the nation-state (U.S.) level and not at an international level.").
8. The claim by environmental activists, such as Lori Wallach, that they caused
the failure of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the
failure to launch a new round at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial suggests that even they
do not believe the loss of influence concern is a real one. See Naim, supra note 2, at
44 (quoting Wallach as saying, "With the MAI, we smashed the shell that was the
OECD. So they just took the pea and put it in another shell. And now it's in the
WTO shell, and we're going to just have to smash that one."). However, this article
will assume that these claims are rhetorical ones, seeking to enhance the influence of
the Wallachians, and thus will not take these claims at face value. Press reports
detailing the major differences between governments on the MAI and the Seattle
Ministerial suggest that intergovernmental differences were sufficient to lead to a
breakdown of the MAI negotiations and the Seattle Ministerial. On the MAI, see
France Pulls Out of OECD Talks on MultilateralInvestment Treaty, 15 INT'L TRADE
REP. 1750 (1998).
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This article proceeds in four parts. The first three parts all
contain an abbreviated legalistic response to lost sovereignty concerns
followed by a longer realpolitik response to lost influence concerns.
In Part I, the relationship between the WTO and the U.S. domestic
legal and political system is explored. In Part II, the institutional (or
rule-making) rules and practices within the WTO are examined. In
Part III, the dispute settlement system of the WTO is analyzed. Part
IV concludes by applauding the decline of lost sovereignty rhetoric.

I. The U.S. Constitution, U.S Trade Politics and the World
Trade Organization
A. Legalistic Response to Lost Sovereignty Concerns
The U.S. constitutional system contains many safeguards and
protections of U.S. sovereignty. The first of these safeguards is that
the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court,
makes the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
international agreements.9 A non-self-executing agreement does not
automatically enter the U.S. domestic legal system and is not a source
of law that can be directly relied upon in U.S. courts. This protection
is enhanced by the fact that courts follow the intent of our elected
political branches on this issue."0 The President and the Congress
elected to make WTO agreements non-self-executing such that
private parties cannot directly rely on WTO obligations in U.S. courts
to challenge governmental policy choices inconsistent with the
agreements.n
This particular protection of sovereignty is not unique to the U.S.
legal system. Indeed, no country in the world is purely "monist,"
which means that no nation gives direct effect or self-executing status
to all treaties in their domestic legal system." Moreover, it is only

9. See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111

(1986); John

H. Jackson, United States, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW ch. 8
(Francis Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
10. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 111 at cmt. h.
11. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(A) (1994).
12. Even in those countries that appear "monist" with respect to treaties, the
courts employ a variety of devices to avoid the doctrine's stringent application. See
John H. Jackson, The Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,

86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 334 (1992) ("The Netherlands, in the view of some, may be the
most monist legal system in the world, but even there, according to eminent

commentators, courts have ways to avoid the direct application of treaty norms.").
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where a treaty has both direct effect and higher status that the latest
expression of the sovereign will does not prevail.13 The U.S.
constitutional system contains neither. Even if the President and
Congress elected to make the WTO (or some future trade agreement)
self-executing, any federal law passed subsequent to the agreement
would prevail in event of a conflict."
B. Realpolitik Response to Lost Influence Concerns
While the doctrine of non-self-executing international
agreements and the later-in-time rule ensure that the latest
expressions of the Congress and the President on trade policy will be
supreme to WTO obligations in the U.S. domestic legal system, these
legal doctrines do not adequately address the concern that entry into
the WTO might change the relative degrees of influence among
domestic U.S. constituencies in determining the latest expression of
the sovereign will by U.S. policy-makers. Yet, there is good reason to
question whether Buchananites and Wallachians could actually lose
influence as a result of the United States entry into the WTO. Entry
into the WTO depended on Congressional approval.15 Indeed,
Congress not only approved of the WTO but, within the same
enactment, also made all the changes to existing U.S. law seen as
necessary to implement the agreement.16 Accordingly, one might
argue that the content of the WTO agreement and the implementing
act, or what can be called the "original bargain," simply represents or
reflects the relative power of various influences in the U.S. policymaking process.
Of course, the WTO was approved and
implemented via the "fast-track" process that only allows for a single
up or down vote on the agreement and implementing provisions."
13. See id. at 330-334. The incidence of both direct effect and higher status is
referred to as 'direct application combined with higher status' (or so-called DAHS).
14. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
15. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 3511(a). On the constitutionality of
congressional-executive agreements, see Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is
NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1995) (supporting the strong
consensus view of the constitutionality of the congressional-executive agreement
method).

16. See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of Administrative
Action, Sept. 27, 1994, availableat 1994 WL 761600 ("The Administration has made

every effort to include all laws in the implementing bill and identify all administrative
actions in this Statement that must be changed in order to conform with the new U.S.
rights and obligations arising from the Uruguay Round agreements.").
17. On the origins of the "fast-track" approval process, see John H. Jackson,
Jean-Victor Louis, & Mitsuo Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal
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But once again, "fast-track" procedures must be approved by
Congress. Thus, one might say that the process established for
approval of the WTO agreement was also a mere reflection of the
degree of influence that the Buchananites and Wallachians have in
the U.S. policy-making process.
A rebuttal to this "mere reflection of influence" hypothesis
might charge that the influence of Buchananites and Wallachians is
reduced because these groups bear the costs of any degree of
uncertainty over the requirements of WTO obligations (and their
application to specific policy measures), as well as uncertainty over
future policy problems and options. For example, imagine a
circumstance in which the U.S. implementing law is found by the
dispute settlement process within the WTO to not faithfully
implement WTO obligations. If the WTO dispute settlement process
creates enough pressure to change the law, then the original bargain
consisting of the agreement and the implementing act provisions
reflecting the degrees of influence of various groups has been
changed. In other words, the Buchananites and Wallachians may
have expended their influence on an implementing law provision in
the original bargain and, therefore, when that provision is later
changed or repealed, the content of the WTO agreement together
with the implementing package is no longer as reflective of the
relative degrees of influence of various groups.
One can also imagine a related situation in which a law in
existence at the time the WTO was approved by Congress was not
changed within the implementing portion of the act, either because it
was viewed as WTO-compliant or because it was completely off the
radar, and subsequently the law is found WTO-inconsistent. If the
Buchananites or Wallachians used their influence to prevent the
elimination of the law (or were simply unaware that the law would
run afoul of WTO obligations and thus did not attempt to exercise
their influence on the content of the WTO agreement) and
subsequently the WTO processes lead to pressure to change the law,
then these groups may view the change to the original bargain as not
reflecting their true level of influence.
Finally, one can imagine a situation in which a policy problem,
not anticipated by the Buchananites or Wallachians, arises
subsequent to the WTO agreement, and a policy option to the
problem supported by Buchananites or Wallachians is defeated
Aspects of ChangingInternationalEconomic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1982).
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because it would run afoul of the WTO agreement. In each of these
three situations, one might argue that the influence of the
Buchananites and Wallachians is reduced because they were allocated
the burden of the costs of uncertainty in the original bargain.
However, even accepting the "loss of influence through bearing the
cost of uncertainty" hypothesis for the moment, it is still essential to
weigh or assess the costs of uncertainty. (The analysis in Part III of
the WTO dispute settlement system suggests that the costs of
uncertainty are relatively low). Moreover, the "mere reflection of
influence" hypothesis suggests that even the allocation of the costs of
uncertainty to the Buchananites and Wallachians in the original
bargain is itself a reflection of their degree of influence as are the
particular changes to U.S. laws and regulations undertaken to
The "mere reflection of
implement rulings of WTO Panels.
influence" hypothesis raises the question of what other influences in
the U.S. policy-making process led to this allocation of the costs of
uncertainty in the original bargain.
In essence, the U.S. government's political branches (the
Congress and the President) "invited" WTO influence into the policymaking process and allocated the costs of uncertainty to the
Buchananites and Wallachians. But why is such an invitation
extended? Is it in response to other concentrated interests or what
other influences are at play? The idea that the U.S. government
welcomes or invites WTO influence into the policy process is, at once,
both consistent and inconsistent with public choice theory that is so
prevalent in trade policy -writings." Public choice theory posits that
politicians are interested in re-election, that campaign funds are
necessary to be re-elected, and, accordingly, that well-organized,
concentrated industry interests are better able to influence policy
than disperse consumer interests because of the lower transaction
costs in pooling together for lobbying efforts and campaign
contributions." Well-organized and concentrated export interests and
18. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a Safeguard: A Positive
Analysis of the GATT Escape Clause with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L.
REv. 255, 274-278 (1991) (using public choice theory to help explain the existence of
the GAT' safeguards provisions); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 5 (1996)
(using public choice theory to evaluate injury analysis in AD and CVD proceedings).
19. See Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and CountervailingDuty
Cases, supra note 18, at 18 ("National governments are viewed as politically
sophisticated actors, each pursuing self-interested agendas such as the maximization
of votes, campaign contributions, and the like. Well-organized and well-financed
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multinational corporations obviously push for the U.S. government to
enter the WTO and abide by the WTO. But is the U.S. government's
invitation to the WTO merely the net result of the battle between
concentrated interests? Or is the invitation by the U.S. government
for WTO influence also extended on behalf of broader consumer
interests and the general welfare?
A realpolitik analysis suggests that government policy makers,
even if responsive to lobbying efforts and campaign contributions,
also pursue the public welfare, i.e. seek to "do good." Indeed,
idealistic "do good" theories of political behavior can share a halfway house with public choice theory. If public choice theory's
underlying premise that politicians have a strong interest in reelection is true (and indeed data in Congressional and Presidential
elections indicate that it is), realpolitik suggests that while
contributions and support from concentrated interests are important
to re-election, it is also important that the politicians "do good," e.g.
maintain a strong economy, and not be seen as too aligned with
special (or concentrated) interests. Increased international trade
accounted for a significant percentage of the growth in the economy
in the last decade-plus and thus politicians quite naturally are
responsive to broader consumer and general welfare influences in
their policy-making as well."
The federal government can, of course, be disaggregated into the
two political branches: the Congress and the Executive Branch. It is
probably the case that the Executive Branch's invitation for WTO
influence is more gracious than that of the Congress. First, public
choice explanations may have relatively stronger explanatory force in
relation to Congress than to the President as a result of the
President's national electoral base and the fact that Presidential
elections are often a referendum on the economy. Second, the
President's heavy emphasis and responsibility in foreign policy21-and
interest groups will influence political outcomes successfully, while poorly organized
or financed interest groups will have little influence. Thus, for example, sizeable
firms and trade associations with much at stake on a particular trade issue are likely

to be effective at influencing policy, while consumers (save for industrial consumers)
are likely to be ineffective because the stakes for each consumer are small and free

rider problems intense.").
20. See Leslie Miller, Greenspan:Shun Barriers to Trade, Growing Protectionist
Sentiments Threaten Economic Growth, Fed Chairman Warns, AUSTIN-AMERICAN
STATESMAN, June 3, 1999, at C1,available at 1999 WL 7414679.
21. For a recognition and critique of Presidential domination in foreign affairs,
see Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
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trade policy's increasing link to broader U.S. foreign policy-suggests
that the President will have greater incentive to follow an open

trading policy in order to garner greater cooperation in other foreign
policy areas (e.g., defense).' Accordingly, it is no surprise then that
the Executive Branch tends to give greater deference to WTO
commitments. Indeed, the Executive often raises WTO obligations as
a reason why Congress should avoid passing certain legislation or for
issuing a veto threat of proposed legislation.'

Even if the Executive

Branch takes an action that runs the risk of violating WTO
commitments, it may be done to ward off even worse action within
the Congress.24 If it is true that the WTO (or, to take it a step further
back, the extension of "fast-track" authority to the President)
constitutes a relative increase in Presidential influence in U.S. trade
policy vis- -vis the Congress? because of the Executive Branch
engaging in the actual international negotiations and handling WTO
dispute settlement cases, and it is true that public choice theory is less
explanatory of Presidential actions than congressional behavior, this
may be another reason why concentrated lobbying groups such as the
Buchananites and Wallachians view the WTO as lessening their
influence.
One should be cautious not to over-exaggerate the differences
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671 (1998).
22. For example, quotas on textiles from Pakistan were loosened in response to
Pakistan's cooperation with the United States in the war on terrorism. However, the
final value of the concessions is only $142 million in 2002 and $476 million over three
years. Pakistan originally requested concessions valued at $1.6 billion. See Chris
Rugaber, Both U.S. and Pakistani Textile Groups 'Disappointed' with Final Trade
Package, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. 319 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Rossella Brenetti, House Ways & Means Recommends Defeat of
Steel Quota Legislation, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 466 (1999) (quoting letter of White
House Chief of Staff John Podesta, "We [the Administration] believe that
implementing HR 975 [imposing quotas on imported steel] constitutes a violation of
our international obligations under the [WTO] and is not in our economic interest.
Because of these concerns, the President's senior advisers would recommend that the
President veto the bill."). See also Susan McInerney & Rossella Brenetti, Pro-Steel
Senator 'HasNo Plans' to Hold Up Summers Nomination, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 920
(1999) (noting Administration veto threat regarding Senate bill that would impose
quotas on imported steel).
24. Some believe this was one reason the Bush Administration took a safeguard
action in the form of increased tariffs against imported steel in March 2002.
25. See, e.g., BRUCE STOKES & PAT CHOATE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
DEMOCRATIZING U.S. TRADE POL'Y 15 (2001) (arguing the 1974 Trade Act, creating
"fast-track" procedures, "dramatically recast the balance of power between Congress
and the
Executive
Branch with regard to
trade"), available at
http://wwv.cfr.orgpdf/DemTradeTF.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,2002).
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between the two branches, however. It is often hard to know for sure
whether Congress is actually allowing the WTO to influence it less
than the Executive Branch.
Congress may vote in favor a
protectionist bill in order to get political credit from concentrated
interests for the attempt, knowing that the vote is a free one that will
have no impact as a result of a Presidential veto.
The Wallachians may suffer a reduction in influence in one
additional way, namely the possibility of limits being placed on
alliances with the Buchananites. The Wallachians can argue that
WTO obligations may make it harder to pass environmental
legislation or issue environmental regulations because protectionist
elements that may allow the legislation to garner additional votes in
Congress or the regulation to receive additional support from those
regulated are not allowed to be included in legislation and regulation.
A clear example of this was the WTO Reformulated Gas case.26 The
case involved a successful challenge by Venezuela to the U.S.
government giving special treatment to domestic refiners, thus
discriminating against foreign refiners, in regards to Clean Air Act
requirements.27 Unlike domestic refiners, foreign refiners were not
allowed by U.S. regulations to establish "individual baselines" for the
cleanliness of their gasoline. Rather foreign refiners had to meet the
"one size fits all" statutory baseline. Indeed, the case involved a
"smoking gun" in that an EPA official testifying before Congress
admitted that they wanted to give domestic refiners a break.
However, the United States, consistent with its WTO obligations,
could have chosen to issue regulations that obtained an even higher
level of environmental protection, and, thus, Wallachians cannot
claim that the WTO forced a lower-level of environmental
protection.'
26. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT'O Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
27. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1977); Regulation of Fuels and
Fuel Additives - Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1996). See
also Appellate Body Faults U.S. in Gas Case, But Reverses on Conservation
Exception, 13 INT'LTRADE REP. 17 (1996).
28. Venezuela actually pointed out this statement to the Panel. See Panel
Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,

WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R, at para. 3.13 (Jan. 1, 1996).
29. See Matthew Schaefer, Non-Identical Yet Twin Challenges of the World
Trading System: Further Advancing the Rule of Law and Legitimacy, in 1997
PROCEEDINGS OF THE XXVI ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 96-97. Indeed, it was primarily business interests, not
environmental interests that challenged EPA implementation of the WTO ruling in a
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The U.S. government's invitation for WTO influence is an
attempt to give greater future support for long-term, general welfareenhancing policies and to provide a check on short-term, politically
expedient policies." However, it is important to note that the WTO is
an imperfect device in this regard. There are numerous traderestricting possibilities built into the WTO's rules that provide
ongoing possibilities for concentrated interests to influence the trade
policy-making process. Realpolitik suggests that it has long been
understood, or long been the practice, in trade-policy making that in
order to obtain trade liberalization, some price must be paid in terms
of trade restricting action. 1 The real question in any given policy
context is whether the price paid is too high for the return, or, in
other words, whether a government has "overpaid" for its pursuit of
trade liberalization.3 2 The WTO gives an ongoing incentive for U.S.

government not to overpay the Buchananites and Wallachians for
further trade liberalization.

II. The WTO Charter, WTO Politics, and U.S. Participation in
the WTO Institution
A. Legalistic Response to Lost Sovereignty Concerns

During the debate over U.S. entry into the WTO, the
manner that would allow foreign refiners to establish individual baselines under
certain conditions. The primary business role in the challenge is not surprising since
"data showed foreign gasoline was actually cleaner than required by the statutory
baseline." See Federal Court Backs Anti-Dumping Program Rule Implementing
Reformulated Gas Program,15 INT'L TRADE REP. 1868 (1998).
30. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The PoliticalEconomy of GlobalMultilateralism,
1 Cm. J. INT'L L. 381 (2000) (arguing that the WTO is actually supportive of
democracy by protecting consumers and citizens from government action done in
response to special interest concerns).
31. See generally SUSAN SCHWAB, TRADE-OFFs: NEGOTIATING THE OMNIBUS
TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS AcT 30 (1994) (developing a formula approach and
arguing that "[t]he add-on component of the formula has facilitated enactment of
authority for trade-liberalizing agreements, but often at a trade-restricting price").
32. Indeed, a central issue in the current trade policy debate in Washington
focuses on the question of whether the Bush Administration is resorting to excessive
protectionism in an effort to secure "fast-track" authority to pursue future trade
liberalization. Compare Rich Thomas, Bush is No Hypocrite, Forget Talk of a Trade
War; Washington Had to Protect U.S. Steel in Order to Promote Free Commerce,
Here's Why, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Mar. 18, 2002, at 67, available at 2002 WL 8965132,
with George Will, Bush Swaps Principles for Politics; Protecting Steel Hurts Car
Buyers, Companies and President'sIntegrity, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at 29,
availableat 2002 WL 6450545.
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Buchananites expressed concerns that the United States risked being
overwhelmed by the many developing nations in the WTO into
accepting new rules without its consent as a result of the WTO's "one
nation, one vote" system.33 The legalistic response, however, shows
that the WTO institutional rules fully protect the United States from
becoming bound by new rules in the absence of its consent despite the
"one nation, one vote" system. For instance, in what would constitute
a final line of defense, the WTO institutional rules provide a right to
terminate membership upon giving six-months notice, a common
feature in many international agreements. 4 Yet, many additional
protections to U.S. sovereignty exist in the rule-making procedures of
the WTO before the ultimate check of termination. The WTO
provides for an amendment procedure to most obligations based on
acceptance by two-thirds of WTO members.35 However, the
institutional rules of the WTO further provide that no amendment
applies to a member unless the member accepts the amendment. 6
WTO institutional rules also provide a procedure for the members to
adopt a formal interpretation of an existing obligation. 37 The WTO
requires a three-fourths vote of approval by members and such
interpretations are binding on all members. However, the WTO
explicitly prohibits the interpretation procedure being used to
undermine the amendments procedure.39
B. Realpolitik Response to Lost Influence Concerns
Within the WTO, as with many international economic
institutions, the United States is a heavyweight. Even other large
powers, such as the European Union, if press reports are to be
33. See also Paul Blustein, Buchanan Attacks Put Trade Group on Spot; Experts
Dispute Candidate's View of WTO, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1996, at B1, available at
1996 WL 3064340 (quoting Buchanan as saying, "[Wlhat are they doing surrendering
our sovereignty to a world trade organization where we get one vote out of 120 and
Fidel Castro can cancel America's vote?").
34. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization art. XV(1) (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].

35. WTO Agreement art. X(5). There are some rules that require consensus to
amend. Obviously, the unanimity required for change of these rules protects the
United States from being bound to any change in these rules in the absence of its

consent. WTO Agreement art. X(2).
36. WTO Agreement art. X(5).
37. WTO Agreement art. IX(2).

38. Id.
39. Id.
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believed, are on occasion jealous of U.S. economic power and
performance.' The underlying fear of the Buchananites is based on
an unfounded and outdated monolithic view of developing countries
that harkens back to calls for a New International Economic Order
within United Nations resolutions in the early 1970's.4' The
Buchananites' concerns ignore the diverse and individualized
interests of developing countries and also ignore the fundamental
ideological turnabout in much of the developing world over the past
three decades towards foreign trade and investment. The ideological
turnabout results not only from pressures within the world trading
system but also from market forces, namely the competition for
foreign investment viewed as necessary to meet development
objectives among developing countries. Indeed, the WTO can be
viewed as essentially enhancing and stabilizing the commitment to
more liberal trade and investment policies (by helping to guard
against a change in policies as a result of change in government
administration) that the market is already demanding of developing
countries. The stability of such a commitment is necessary to reap the
full-benefits of the more liberal policies by signaling foreign traders
and investors. Abusive use of WTO rule-making procedures would
undermine the additional benefits of stability and be reacted to
negatively in the capital markets.
This is not to say that broad groups of developing countries
never seek or maintain alliances in the WTO, but such alliances are
40. See Lenore Taylor, Reform Needed to Emulate IT Boom in U.S., AUSTL. FIN.
REV., Mar. 8, 2001, at 16, available at 2001 WL 2730143 ("The leading economic

researchers in Europe are still casting envious eyes across the Atlantic, even though
the eurozone economies are growing at a healthy 3 per cent this year and the United

States economy is slowing so fast it may start to go backwards."); Mark Atkinson,
Poor Need Penicillin Before Pentiums, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2000, available at
2000 WL 25690313 ("[E]nvious governments in Japan, Britain, and the rest of
Europe have all been attempting to replicate the experience of America to boost the

incomes of their citizens for some time.").
41. See Brazilian Ambassador Celso Amorim, The WTO From the Perspective of
a Developing Country, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95 (2000) ("Illusions of a radical
transformation of the world trading system, epitomized in the notion of a new
economic order, have given way to a more sober and realistic approach based on the

possibility of continuous incremental gains."). For a brief history of the call in the
1970's for a new international economic order, see Remarks of Harold Koh, The New
International Economic Order, 87 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 459 (1993)
("[D]eveloping nations sought [institutions] . . . to work against traditional freemarket notions of sanctity of contract and property, free trade, pacta sunt servanda,

and - most notably - against the industrialized nations rule of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.").
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not formed for the abusive purposes feared by the Buchananites.
Indeed, the formal amendment and interpretation procedures have
never been used in the seven-plus years of the operation of the WTO.
Instead of being subject to abuse, the concern among WTO scholars
tends to be quite the opposite.' Namely, the institutional rules may
be too rigid for rule development within the WTO. Indeed, the
realpolitik for which the Buchananites did not account is the strong
pull towards the use of consensus in WTO decision-making and away
from fallback voting rules. The strong pull towards consensus
decision-making is found within the legal text of the WTO but even
more deeply ingrained in the culture of the WTO. One of the
greatest examples of the strong pull towards consensus decisionmaking occurred in the selection of a new Director-General for the
WTO in 1999. At that time, there was disagreement among WTO
members over whether Mike Moore or Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi
should replace Renato Ruggiero (whose normal four-year term
expired) as Director-General. Since only a majority vote was
required to install either candidate, an outsider might expect that the
side with majority support would press its case to a vote. Instead,
however, countries continued to pursue a consensus over the course
of many months, ultimately finding consensus in a solution that
Moore would serve a three-year term, followed by a three-year term
for Dr. Supachai"
Since the WTO's creation, the only way new rules and
commitments have been created is through the formal negotiation
process and, informally, through Ministerial declarations. While
some hoped that WTO rules could be adapted more quickly than the
use of traditional, broad-based, and lengthy negotiating rounds-and,
indeed, sector-specific agreements on information technology
products, telecommunications, and financial services were concluded
in the first three years of the WTO-the WTO finds itself once again
relying on the negotiating round method as the near exclusive means
of rulemaking. While developing country influence in agenda-setting
for and negotiations in the new Doha Round (launched in November
42. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 7, at 174-75 ("[T]he negotiators greatly
restricted the decision-making powers of the WTO bodies, even to the point of
concern that the WTO will be hamstrung by inaction derived from its consensus
culture."); John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, 3
J. INT'L ECON. L. 329 (1998).
43. See Daniel Pruzen & Gary Yerkey, WTO Compromise Splits Six-Year Term
Between Moore and Supachai,16 INT'L TRADE REP. 1200 (1999).
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2001)" has increased, the agreement of the two largest economies, the
United States and the European Union, is still the linchpin of any
Round launch or conclusion.
Developing countries have become relatively more assertive in
part because of experiences in the Uruguay Round. While it is true
that a nation's consent is a fundamental cornerstone of entry into the
WTO as with any treaty, voluntary joining of the WTO does not
mean that developing countries would not have preferred a different
set of rules in some areas. The best example of this is in the
intellectual property area. Many developing countries would have
preferred that intellectual property commitments be kept out of the
WTO. However, when the Uruguay Round was concluded, the
agreements were put together as a "single package" of agreements.
Countries, with a few exceptions, could not pick and choose "A la
carte" among the many agreements under the WTO institutional
umbrella. The "single package" approach combined with the fact
that the large countries, such as the United States, were going to
withdraw from the old GATT at the time of entering the WTO, left
developing countries in the position of having to join the WTOincluding its intellectual property commitments-to preserve existing
assurances of market access in goods. In short, the large market and
large economic power of the United States allows it to exercise
significant influence over the WTO agenda and the evolution of
WTO agreements.
I. WTO Dispute Settlement System in Relation to the U.S.
Legal and Political System
A. Legalistic Response to Lost Sovereignty Concerns
The single greatest target of sovereignty rhetoric during
consideration of the Uruguay Round Agreements was the dispute
In terms of
settlement system established within the WTO.
traditional notions of sovereignty, the dispute settlement system was
not a threat because of the constitutional device of non-self-executing
international obligations. While a binding international obligation is
created by WTO dispute settlement reports,' 6 and trade sanctions may
44. See WTO - Doha Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001,
WTO Doe. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).

45. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 47 (2d ed. 1997).
46. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding -
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result if the United States refuses to comply, the reports do not have
any effect in the U.S. domestic legal system. 47 As with the WTO
agreement itself, the political branches made clear their intent that
WTO dispute settlement reports are non-self-executing.' Thus, it is
up to the political branches to implement any such report through a
change in regulation (by the Executive Branch if Congress previously
delegated such authority) or change in law (through joint action of
the Congress and the Executive Branch).
B. Realpolitik Response to Lost Influence Concerns
The WTO dispute settlement system is considered more binding
than the system under the old GATT (referred to, on occasion, as the
"General Agreement to Talk and Talk," although the compliance
record under the old GATT was certainly impressive in practice49).
The WTO system is considered more binding or "judicialized"
because a defendant country can no longer "block" the process at
various stages.'
First, a defendant country cannot block
establishment of a panel under the WTO system. In other words, the
right to have a three-person panel of arbitrators hear a case is
"automatic." Second, a losing party cannot block adoption of the
Panel Report (adoption of the report leads to a binding international
legal obligation to come into compliance). Third, plaintiff countries
that win a case will receive automatic authorization to retaliate in the
form of trade sanctions in the event of prolonged non-compliance by
a losing-defendant country.
The Buchananites and Wallachians resisted the system because
the United States could no longer exercise blocking rights on behalf

Misunderstanding the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1997)
("[A]n adopted dispute settlement report establishes an international law obligation
upon the member in question to change its practices to make it consistent with the
rules of the WTO agreement and its annexes.").
47. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 102(b)(2)(B)(i) (stating that in any
suit by the federal government concerning a state law, "a report of a dispute
settlement panel or the Appellate Body... shall not be considered as binding or
otherwise accorded deference").
48. Id.; see also Relationship of the Agreements to United States Law and State
Law, Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 3512 ("Reports issued by panels or the
Appellate Body... have no binding effect under the law of the United States and do
not represent an expression of U.S. foreign or trade policy.").
49. See ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 273-85

(1993).
50. See JOHN H. JACKSON,

THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM

124-25 (2d ed. 1997).
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of their groups' interests."
The realpolitik in the old GATT,
however, placed limits on the U.S. exercise of the blocking right. The
United States and other countries occasionally used blocking rights
(as well as the bringing of disputes) as a negotiating tactic for greater
leverage during the Uruguay Round negotiations. However, the
strong U.S. interests in an open trading system that would be further
strengthened and extended into new areas, such as services,
ultimately meant the United States had to exhibit leadership. In
short, it was not as if U.S. power within the GATT was often
exercised on behalf of the domestic interests that would be adversely
affected by adoption of a Panel Report. Thus, the elimination of the
blocking right does not represent a significant reduction in the
opportunities for the Buchananites and Wallachians to exert their

influence.
Additionally, under the WTO

dispute settlement

system,

countries that lose at the Panel level have an automatic right to
appeal to a standing seven-member Appellate Body. Although only
three members of the Appellate Body hear and decide the case, the
cases are discussed with the other members to ensure consistency in
approach. The right to appeal was part of the trade-off for giving up
the right to block adoption of Panel Reports. In a high percentage of
cases, countries exercise their right to appeal. One general critique of
the powers of the Appellate Body is that they are exercising "law-

51. See WTO's Slow Motion Coup Against Democracy (Interview with Lori
Wallach), supra note 2 ("GATT's dispute settlement system, for instance, required
consensus to adopt any enforcement of it. Any individual country could exercise a
sovereignty "emergency break," block consensus and stop implementation of a
ruling.").
52. The United States did "block" adoption of several Panel Reports during the
course of the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1994), but often the United States
maintained the block for less than a year. For a description of three instances of
blocking by the United States from 1986-1990, see HUDEC, supra note 49, at 221,254.
53. The United States ultimately allowed adoption of most GATY" cases dealing
with trade remedies, except if there was a fundamental principle involved, such as
when it blocked adoption of the Swedish Steel report that called for full refund by the
United States of collected duties under the anti-dumping order. The United States
objected to the retroactive nature of the proposed remedy. See id. at 253-54. In the
environmental area, the United States opposed adoption of the controversial TunaDolphin rulings issued by GATT Panels in 1991 and 1994 (Mexico joined the United
States in opposing adoption of the 1991 ruling). However, the "greening" of WTO
jurisprudence by the Appellate Body is far preferable to exercising a "block" that
would risk isolating the United States and polarizing WTO members on
environmental issues.
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making" functions' and placing the burden of "cost of uncertainty"
on the Buchananites 55 (The Wallachians have fared much better on
substantive matters as the analysis of cases below will reveal).
Charges that the Appellate Body is "making law" are the inevitable
result of the difficultly in utilizing the formal institutional possibilities
for rule-making (such as the amendment and, to a more limited
extent, interpretation powers of the WTO). The charges may also be
the inevitable result of WTO members "papering over" certain
disagreements in the final stages of negotiations or the occasional
unintentional introduction of ambiguity into the legal text of
agreements.16 However, the line between law-making and lawinterpretation is not an easy one to draw in any context. The
Appellate Body, and consequently the Panels, have been quite
faithful to their instruction to interpret the agreements in accordance
with customary international law rules on interpretation (as codified
in the Vienna Convention) that place primary emphasis on the text of
the agreements.
There was some concern expressed by legal academics prior to its
creation that the Appellate Body might exercise too much of a
"political filter," thus undermining the move towards legalization.57
However, the Appellate Body has ruled numerous times against the
large economies in the system, including the United States. The
54. See, e.g., Claude Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of
the World Trade Organization,2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 403, 408 (2001) ("[T]here is no real
consensus among WTO members on many of the complex regulatory issues that the
panels and the AB will be asked to rule upon, and in many instances the underlying
treaty text contains gaps, ambiguities, and contradictory language. Politically, the
imbalance between the ineffective rulemaking procedures and the highly efficient
judicial mechanisms will increasingly pressure the panels and AB to 'create' law,
raising intractable questions of democratic legitimacy."); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty
and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401, 414-415 (2000) ("[Tjhere is still the
question of whether in fact we knowingly agreed to enact something like this when
the U.S. created and became a member of the WTO.... WTO critics argued that
they thought they were getting international trade agreements and instead discovered
roving, quasi-constitutional rules (generativity) emanating from inaccessible tribunals
in Geneva (insularity).").
55. See, e.g., Alan Wm.Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 417, 420-422 (2001) ("The WTO Secretariat has arrogated to itself through
dispute settlement a legislative function to fill in the gaps and clarify the ambiguities
in trade agreements ....) (discussing in particular several WTO cases dealing with
trade remedy laws).
56. See, e.g., Joel Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 333 (1999) (explaining that the development of rules through interpretation
may be more efficient than resolving all ambiguities in initial negotiations).
57. See Schaefer, supra note 5, at 328-29.
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realpolitik is that the Appellate Body operates without "rabbit ears,"
but like most, if not all, judicial bodies, it probably does not have (and
it would probably be unwise for it to have) completely "tin ears."
One of the great ironies is that the very "faceless bureaucrats," ' s the
WTO Panels and the Appellate Body, that the Buchananites and
Wallachians criticized within their lost sovereignty rhetoric have
created jurisprudence (based on their interpretation of legal text)
supporting the right of non-governmental interests to submit amicus
briefs and the right of the Panels and Appellate Body to consider
such briefs. 9 In contrast, many WTO members have expressed
concern with this jurisprudence and have rejected calls to formalize
the amicus brief submission process and further open up dispute
The Buchananites and Wallachians are
settlement proceedings.'
further aided in their influence by the transparency measures the
United States has enacted domestically regarding U.S. submissions in
WTO disputes.6 Indeed, on occasion, the U.S. government has
appended amicus briefs of non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") to its own brief to ensure the panels receive the amicus
briefs.62 The ability of the Buchananites and Wallachians to garner a
not insignificant degree of participation and transparency in the
dispute settlement process suggests that their political power and
influence has not been eviscerated in the era of the WTO. 6
58. See Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach, GATT, NAFTA and the Subversion of the
Democratic Process,in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN
TOWARD THE LOCAL 93-94 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996) (arguing
decisions "would be deferred to a group of unelected bureaucrats sitting behind
closed doors in Geneva").
59. Arthur Appleton, Amicus Curiae Submissions in the Carbon Steel Case:
Another Rabbit From the Appellate Body's Hat?, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 691 (2000);
Editor's Note, Issues of Amicus CuriaeSubmissions, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 701 (2000).
60. WTO Appellate Body Under Fire for Move to Accept Amicus Curiae Briefs
from NGOs, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. 1805 (2000) ("[A] large majority of WTO
members criticized the Appellate Body for fixing procedures that should be decided
by members themselves, and, in effect, giving outsiders such as non-governmental
organizations more rights to participate in dispute proceedings than those granted to
members."). The Asbestos Case was the first case in which the Appellate Body
established actual procedures for submission of amicus briefs.
61. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 3537.
62. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12,1998).
63. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Economic and Social Actors in the World
Trade Organization,7 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 259, 273 (2001) ("Both NGOs and
the private sector are far better positioned to influence the trading system in 2000
than they were in 1990.... Eventually, the resistance of the WTO to greater
cooperation and consultation with NGOs will melt away.").
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The Buchananites and Wallachians also worry about the
"automatic" authorization of trade retaliation by the WTO if the

United States should fail to comply with a panel or Appellate Body
report. 64 However, the realpolitik is that other countries are not
necessarily anxious to retaliate against the United States. In the case
of smaller countries, retaliation in many instances against a large
country like the United States may be ineffective.65 The possibility for

so-called cross-retaliation, namely retaliation in the services or
intellectual property sectors for violation in the goods sector or vice
versa, does little to eliminate the differences in the impact of trade
sanctions.' Even in the case of larger economies, like the EU, the
"shoot yourself in the foot" effect of trade retaliation tempers the
drive to proceed with retaliation against the United States in many

instances. In other words many EU interests (industrial import users,
wholesalers and retailers of imported goods, consumers) would be

hurt by any retaliation against the United States. The same is true
when the United States retaliates against the European Union (as any
specialty gourmet retailer will tell you when French cheese is placed
on a retaliation list). Moreover, the United States may sometimes
elect to suffer trade retaliation (or indeed offer compensation)
instead of changing a law or measure found to be WTO-inconsistent.
In other words, there is the opportunity for "civil disobedience" in the
system. 67

64. See WTO's Slow Motion Coup Against Democracy (Interview with Lori

Wallach), supra note 2 (Lori Wallach argues that the WTO "is totally different
phenomenon than the notion of being a party to a contract from which you can walk
away. For instance, under WTO rules, it requires unanimous consensus to stop the
institution from implementing a decision issued by a WTO tribunal or authorizing
permanent trade sanctions against countries that refuse to change their domestic laws
to comply with a WTO decision.").
65. See William Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
51(1987).
66. See WTO Agreement art. 22(3). Equador received authorization to crossretaliate in services and intellectual property areas against the EU for the EU's
refusal to comply with the WTO Appellate Body's ruling in the bananas case. See
Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WTO Doc. WT/DS/OV/4, at 99-103
(Feb. 6, 2002).
67. See Robert Hudec, GATT Legal Constraints and the Use of Trade Measures
Against Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95, 152-54

(Bhagwati and Hudec eds., 1996). Unfortunately, in an effort to strongly reject lost
sovereignty claims, sometimes U.S. government officials have overemphasized the
reality of a lack of WTO police force and the possibility for instances of "civil
disobedience" within the WTO system to claim that WTO obligations are just like a
contract. Thus, compliance is simply an equally preferred option to compensation or
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The final element of the realpolitik rebuttal to claims of lost
influence moves from the procedural aspects of the dispute
settlement process to instead focus on the actual impact of VTO
cases involving the United States. An unfortunate response to lost
sovereignty rhetoric has been to focus on win-loss records within
VTO dispute settlement. The win-loss record is an inaccurate gauge
of the success or failure of the system for many reasons: it fails to take
account of the importance of the cases (both in terms of principle and
the amount of affected trade), fails to account for cases in which a
party wins on principle but loses the case in a manner in which it can
easily rectify, and fails to take account of all the instances in which
presence of the system has lead to compliance in advance of any
complaint being brought. Most importantly, the win-loss record fails
to recognize that in some cases where the U.S. government has
apparently
"lost" a case, that the United States may actually have
"won." 's As mentioned to earlier, a VITO Appellate Body Report
may give Congress an extra-incentive to reverse special interest
legislation that works against consumer (or broader citizen)
interests.69 Naturally, officials cannot publicly announce this type of
analysis, for the Executive Branch will not publicly accuse the
Congress (or itself) of being motivated by protectionist, special
interests.
Instead of focusing on win-loss records, one needs to place the
first seven years of VITO dispute settlement into perspective in order
to see the extent to which VITO dispute settlement is having an
influence over U.S. policy choices (beyond what the United States
already specifically implemented when it joined the VTO). It is best
to divide the cases the United States has lost as a defendant into four
groups. In the first group, the United States has lost a series of cases
dealing with trade remedy laws, namely safeguards, anti-dumping,
and countervailing duty law.70 Most of these have been relatively
to allowing retaliation. However, this undercuts the clear intention of WTO
members to enhance the binding characteristics of WTO rules and dispute settlement
findings, which is highlighted by the fact that the WTO legal text makes clear that
compensation or retaliation is only to be temporary pending full compliance with
Panel and Appellate Body reports.
68. See Schaefer, supra note 5,at 335-36.
69. Id. at 335-36.
70. See generally Appellate Body Report, United States - Restrictions on
Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WTO Doc. WT/DS24/ABJR
(Feb. 25, 1997); Appellate Body Report, United States - Measure Affecting Imports
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/ABIR (May 23,
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minor decisions that have not required (at least from the U.S. point of
view) any legislative changes. Rather, most of these cases have
required only minor adjustments in determinations or analysis in
individual cases, or simply non-renewal of expiring measures or
slightly early termination of measures.7 1 In the one case clearly
requiring a legislative change, the legislative change is not to U.S.
anti-dumping law itself but rather to a rarely utilized (and never
successfully utilized) 1916 law that allows for private damages actions
against those that dump products into the United States. The
Executive Branch has proposed repeal of the law but has not exerted
a great deal of energy or pressure on the Congress as of yet. Since the
United States was ultimately willing to place its trade remedy laws on
the negotiating table in the new WTO Negotiating Round launched at
Doha, it is likely the negotiating process will be more significant than
the dispute settlement cases to date both in terms of possible changes
to U.S. trade remedy laws7' and in creating the opportunity to rollback any results viewed as unacceptable during the dispute settlement
1997); Panel Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above from Korea, WTO Doc.
WT/DS99/R (Mar. 19, 1999); Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916, WTO Doc. WT/DS136/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2000) ; Appellate Body Report,
United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WTO Doc.
WT/DS138/ABIR (June 7, 2000); Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities,
WTO Doc. WT/DS166/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States
- Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New
Zealand and Australia, WTO Docs. WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 16,
2001); Panel Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel
Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea, WTO Doc.
WT/DS179/R (Feb. 1, 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Hot Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WTO Doc.
WT/DS184/AB/R (Aug. 23, 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WTO Doc.
WT/DS192/AB/R (Nov. 5,2001).
71. See, e.g., Wheat Gluten Extension Gets Congress Backing, ITC Reaffirms,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 11, 2001, at 11; Administration Cans Wheat Gluten 201,
Comes Up Short on Assistance, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 1, 2001, at 1; USTR to End
Lamb TRQ Early in Wake of Adverse WTO Ruling, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 7,
2001, at 19. In some cases, a legal justification as to why legislative changes are not
required becomes difficult, although the political sensitivity of legislative changes in
the trade remedy area may still mean no legislative change will be pursued. See, e.g.,
U.S. Mulls Changes to Anti-Dumping Law to Comply with WTO Decision, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Jan. 11, 2002, at 1, 18.
72. For the large scope of possible reform proposals, see Konstantinos
Adamantopoulos & Diego De Notaris, The Future of the WTO and the Reform of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement: A Legal Perspective,24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 30 (2000).
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process.73
In the second group, the United States also "lost" two wellpublicized environment-related cases: the Reformulated Gas case,74
concerning U.S. standards for refined petroleum products under the
Clean Air Act, and the Shrimp-Turtle case,75 involving a U.S. ban on
imported shrimp from countries not employing turtle-excluding
devices in their fishing methods. However, implementation of the
two Appellate Body Reports simply required administrative
changes.76 Additionally, one could strongly argue in the ShrimpTurtle case that the administrative changes ultimately lead to proenvironment results. For example, in response to the Shrimp-Turtle
decision, the United States was required to redouble its efforts in
negotiating cooperative international agreements on turtle protection
and its efforts in transferring the necessary turtle-protecting
technology to the developing country plaintiffs. The efforts were
largely successful, thus enhancing protection of sea turtles. The one
significant environmental downside to the case-the fear that
countries would divide their shrimp fisheries and only employ turtleexcluder devices in the ones used for export to the United Stateshas not occurred. Perhaps, most importantly, the Appellate Body's
legal analysis of the major GATT articles creating exceptions, within
limits, for measures necessary to the protection of human, animal,
and plant life or health, and relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, is far "greener" than pre-WTO case
law.' Indeed, in Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body confirms that in
73. See Zoellick: Congress Must Act to Stave Off EU FSC Retaliation, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 8, 2002, at 1, 16 (referencing a letter from Trade Representative

Zoellick to Sen. Rockefeller making this very point).
74. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996).
75. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS5S/ABJR (adopted Nov. 6, 1998).
76. Malaysia was the only plaintiff country that contested the administrative
implementation of the ruling, arguing that legislative change was required. A WTO

compliance panel upheld the U.S. view that administrative action alone was sufficient
to implement the original Appellate Body report. See Panel Report, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/RW (Nov. 21, 2001). Thus, Ms. Wallach overstated the results of the
Appellate Body opinion when she argued that the U.S. law had to be changed or
eliminated. See Lori Wallach, Transparency in WTO Dispute Resolution, 31 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 773 (2000).
77. See EU Tables Alternative Proposalson Environment for Doha Declaration,

18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1590 (2001) (quoting an anonymous Asian Ambassador to the
WTO as saying, "If you look at WTO rulings ... they are moving the frontiers of
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certain limited circumstances (the exact confines subject to some
debate) a WTO member country can impose unilateral trade
sanctions to help protect an endangered species, many of which lie
outside its territory. It is also important to note that the "greening"
of GATT interpretations by the WTO Appellate Body does not stop
with cases in which the United States is involved. In the Asbestos
case,78 Canada lost its challenge to a French ban on asbestoscontaining products. Significantly, the Appellate Body ruled that
"health effects" were an appropriate consideration in determining
that the Canadian asbestos-containing products were not "like
products" with the French asbestos-free products. Thus, the French
measure did not violate GATT's national treatment obligation and
France did not even have to rely on any GATT exception to justify its
measure.
In the third group, there are a series of cases brought primarily
by the European Union against U.S. measures in which legislative
implementation (e.g. action by Congress, not just the Administration
alone) will be required. The motivation, or at least one of the key
motivations, behind these cases was the European frustration over
losing two early WTO cases (regarding Bananas79 and Beef
Hormones?) that required politically-difficult legislative changes for
implementation and frustration over being subject to $300 millionplus in trade retaliation by the United States." The early cases the
United States lost were capable of implementation by administrative
action and the EU wanted the United States Executive Branch to see
first-hand how difficult implementation was when it necessitated
action by the U.S. Congress.' The aforementioned case involving the
1916 Anti-Dumping Act could be co-listed in this .category.
WTO rules to accommodate [environmental and health] concerns. This is in itself a
revolutionary advance. They are getting through dispute settlement much more than
what they would get through negotiations.").
78. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting
Asbestos Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (Apr. 5,2001).
79. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept.
25, 1997).
80. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WTIDS26/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998).
81. See Alan Wm.Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 417, 418-419 (2001). My conversations with European academics and officials at
conferences at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy in 2001 confirm

this account.
82. See id.
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Repealing that law will have little impact since, as mentioned above,
no case has ever been successfully brought under the law.' (The EU
could, of course, argue the mere existence of the statute creates some
additional deterrence, e.g., bringing an unsuccessful case creates some
litigation costs for the alleged dumpers).' Also in this category is the
challenge to a provision of the U.S copyright act that exempts small
restaurants and bars from making payments for playing copyrighted
music.85 Since most music played is not of foreign-origin, it is not
surprising that the annual level of damage caused to the EU by this
exemption was determined to be little more than a million dollars a
year. To avoid even this small amount of potential trade retaliation,
the Administration is seeking Congressional authorization to pay a
European musicians fund $1.1 million per year for the next three
years while deciding on a long-term implementation strategy. 6 The
EU also won a decision against a provision of U.S. law that prevents
U.S. courts from recognizing or enforcing any trademark rights if
those rights were previously abandoned by a trademark owner whose
business and assets were confiscated under Cuban law.' The case
essentially involves a battle between a French-Cuban joint venture
and Bacardi's over the use of the "Havana Club" trademark. While
the United States has not repealed or amended the law yet, many
U.S. business interests are pressing for implementation of the
Appellate Body report to avoid potential infringement of U.S.
trademarks by Cuba.'
The case with the greatest importance and potential impact in
this third group is the Foreign Sales Corporation ("FSC") case.' In
the FSC case, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that a provision of U.S.
tax law allowing U.S. corporations to set up offshore subsidiaries that
solicit, negotiate, and contract with foreign buyers and whose sales
are partially exempt from U.S. taxes (and whose dividends paid to the
83. See Dumping: EU, Japan Agree to Give U.S. More Time to Comply with 1916
Act, Copyright Rulings, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. 133 (2002).

84. See id.
85. See Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R (July 27,2000).
86. See id.
87. See United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act, WTO Doc.
WT/DS/176/R (Feb. 1, 2001).
88. See U.S. Companies Begin Push to Convince Congress to Relax Embargo
Against Cuba, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. 662 (2002).
89. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign

Sales Corporations," WTO Doc. WT/DS108/ABIR (Mar. 20,2000).
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parent corporation are completely exempt from taxation) constituted
a prohibited export subsidy under the Subsidies Agreement.' The
U.S. Congress amended the law9' in response to the original
Appellate Body report but the WTO Appellate Body ultimately ruled
that the amended measure still constituted a prohibited export
subsidy.
The FSC case is controversial for many reasons, not the least of
which is the dollar value of possible trade retaliation, likely to fall
between one and four billion dollars. (Of course, one must realize
that there is roughly $400 billion in annual trade in goods between the
EU and the United States). Another reason is that the dispute stems
from fundamental differences in tax systems. Since EU country tax
systems are generally territorial, taxing only income earned in the
territory, rather than "world wide" income like the U.S. system, these
countries need not give any special exemption to export related sales.
The EU countries also rely more heavily on indirect taxation
(namely, the value added tax or VAT) and there is an exemption
from WTO export subsidy disciplines for rebates of indirect taxes
paid on exported goods." While there is no explicit exemption for the
U.S. law, there was an understanding ever since a series of cases in
the 1970's between the United States and the European Community
over the FSC predecessor, the DISC,94 and European income tax
systems, not to bring such cases. 9 In other words, many believed
there was a permanent cease-fire over what are essentially differences
in fundamental approaches to tax systems.
While some in Congress quietly welcomed the ruling, as an
opportunity for more wholesale reform of the U.S. tax system,"
others viewed the case as a major incursion into an area most
90. For a concise description of the facts and reasoning, see Raj Bhala & David
Gantz, WTO Case Review 2000, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 56-63 (2001).
91. See FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
92. See Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations," WTO Doc. WT/DS108/RW (Jan. 29, 2000).
93. See WTO Agreement, art. I, at n.1.
94. See John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC
Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978); Robert Hudec, Reforming GATT
Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443
(1988).
95. See Wolff, supra note 81, at 418.
96. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas (R-CA) wants to
use the decision to overhaul the U.S. tax system. See U.S. Headingfor Procedural
FSC Response: Stymied by Substance, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 29, 2002, at 1, 18.
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connected with sovereignty-a nation's ability to decide its general
approach to revenue-raising methods. However, major overhaul of
the U.S. tax system is not the necessary implication of the ruling.
There may still be ways of implementing the report that do not
involve a major overhaul of the tax system (although the minor cures
tend to impact differently, and thus divide support among, the
multinationals taking advantage of the FSC).97 Also, the United
States may still be able to negotiate a solution that would include
some compensatory payoff to the EU, either in direct relation to the
case or in the context of the new Round.
It is worthwhile mentioning a fourth group of cases that deal with
foreign-policy related trade and investment measures. Specifically, in
1996, the EU initiated a dispute settlement case against America's
Helms-Burton Act. The act creates a sanctions regime against
companies that "traffick" in expropriated U.S. property in Cuba. The
sanctions are in the form of visa restrictions and private actions for
damages in U.S. courts, although this latter sanction is not possible
because the Executive Branch, consistent with the legislation,
continues to waive its application. 9 The EU, along with Japan, also
initiated a dispute settlement case the following year against the
United States over a Massachusetts statute imposing a negative ten
percent preference for purposes of determining the low-bidder in
procurement against companies active in Burma.99 Both of these
cases raised sensitive foreign-policy issues, and could have created
considerable controversy within the WTO. The Helms-Burton case,
in particular, could have created such controversy because the United
States may have invoked the rarely considered, so-called "national
security exception" within the GATT. 1°0
However, neither of these cases resulted in a Panel
determination."'

At a EU-U.S. summit meeting, the two parties

agreed that the EU would enhance cooperation with the United
States in disciplining dealings in expropriated U.S. property in Cuba
97. See id.
98. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel, United States - The Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doe. WT/DS38/6 (Apr. 24,1998).
99. See Communication by the Secretariat, United States - Measure Affecting
Government Procurement, WTO Doc. WTIDS88/6 (Feb. 14,2000).
100. See Helms-Burton Law Would Not Qualify for GATT Security Exemption,
Lawyer Says, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 1604 (1998).
101. See EU to Drop Case on Helms-Burton Law When Time Limit Expires in
WTO This Month, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 648 (1998).
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and the U.S. Executive agreed to seek waiver authority for the visa
sanction provisions of Helms-Burton."° While the agreement has
never been fully implemented,'3 the case has never been
reinvigorated. The EU and Japan dropped the WTO case over the
Massachusetts' Burma law when the National Foreign Trade Council,
an association of over 400 U.S. businesses engaged in international
trade, successfully challenged the law on domestic U.S. constitutional
grounds."° The Supreme Court found the Massachusetts law was
preempted, not by the WTO agreements, but rather by a federal law
sanctioning Burma."
The net result of the "lost" WTO cases in which the United
States was the defendant indicates that the impact is quite minimal."
One might summarize the results as follows: minor adjustments
within individual trade remedy determinations; no changes to trade
remedy laws as of yet; if changes to trade remedy law occur they are
likely to be surpassed in importance by changes negotiated within the
context of the new round (although the new round also provides an
opportunity to roll-back the effect of rulings); two environmental
cases requiring administrative but not legislative changes, at least
some of which advance the environmental goals of the laws; a
"greening" of WTO jurisprudence; a handful of "poke-in-the-eye,
you're going to see how it feels to need Congressional action for
implementation"-type cases requiring adjustments in laws with little
economic or other impact; a massaging or alternative handling of
sensitive foreign policy cases; and, to be sure, one "punch-to-the-gut"type case, the FSC case, that is more important economically and that
could potentially trigger significant change in U.S. tax laws. This
summary reveals quite an irony. The "costs of uncertainty" placed
upon those employing lost sovereignty rhetoric and most concerned

102. See U.S., EU Approve Plan to Resolve Dispute Over Helms-Burton, Officials

Say, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 686 (1997).
103. See U.S. Pledges to Work on Helms-Burton, ILSA at EU Request, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 13, 2001, at 15.

104. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998),
affid, Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), affd,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
105. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-74.
106. See Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Experience with WTO Dispute Settlement, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 697, 698 (2000) (concluding that changes to U.S. laws and regulations as a
result of WTO dispute settlement "have been relatively minor to date and the
majority of them have had limited or no commercial consequences for the United
States").
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with lost influence, the Buchananites and Wallachians, is quite
minimal while "costs of uncertainty" imposed on large exporters and
multinationals benefiting from the FSC, such as Boeing, Microsoft,
Exxon, and General Motors, may be quite large.
IV. Conclusion
The use of lost sovereignty rhetoric to oppose the WTO has
receded to a degree. This is no surprise given the ease with which the
claim of lost sovereignty can be debunked through pure legal analysis.
It is also unsurprising because the underlying concerns of the
Buchananites and Wallachians are lost influence of the United States
and lost influence of their groups in the U.S. policy-making process.
However, a realpolitik analysis of the WTO, grounded in the actual
operation of the institution during its first seven years, suggests that
lost influence concerns, if not completely unfounded like lost
sovereignty concerns, are greatly exaggerated.
In response to
concerns of lost influence for the United States in the world trading
system (or, alternatively, concerns of excessive WTO influence in
U.S. policy-making), realpolitik tells us that U.S. economic power
continues to give the United States considerable leverage in matters
relating to the negotiation and enforcement of WTO obligations. In
response to concerns of lost influence for the Buchananites and
Wallachians in the U.S. policy-making process, realpolitik tells us that
the Buchananites have indeed borne some of the costs of uncertainty
of WTO obligations and the Wallachians relatively less. The
difference between the two groups is unsurprising because the WTO
focuses its efforts on measures in which a protectionist purpose
predominates. The relatively small size of the costs of uncertainty
borne by these two groups is unsurprising because the WTO is a
gradual and imperfect move towards trade liberalization, itself
unsurprising given that it is only partially inspired by general-welfare
enhancing, consumer empowering, "do good" rationales of
politicians.
Moreover, the lost influence concerns of the
Buchananites and Wallachians appear further exaggerated when
realpolitik shows us that large exporters and multinational
corporations also shoulder some of the costs of uncertainty.

